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FRANCE AND PORTUGAL IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR -
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

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CHAPTER 7

"For this reason, our enterprise goes beyond National issues and is converted into a crusade in which the fate of Europe is at stake."

General Franco

The coup d'état that occurred in Spain on 17 July, 1936 was projected to be a short military uprising that would restore the country back to its traditional, Catholic order. When the masses revolted against the military junta led by General Jose Sanjurjo, the generals were unprepared for the people's unexpected determination. The reaction was fanned like wildfire and open warfare began in virtually every town and city of Spain. The ideologies that clashed, traditional Catholic Spain against leftist Popular Front Spain, could not be contained within Spain's borders. The war quickly took on dimensions that shared some of the traits of the great religious wars of Europe with the opposing sides no longer labeled Catholic and Protestant but Communist and Fascist. Europe had already begun to divide into blocs while countries were internally torn apart by the two political camps. As the bourgeoisie faced the proletariat, the atheist faced the Catholic, and the "Red" faced the

fascist, the ideological trenches of Europe were drawn, and in the course of the next three years the Spanish Civil War would completely alter the political balance of Europe.

Spain's Civil War immediately took on the aspects of an international ideological war. Foreign intervention was apparent from the beginning when the Army of Africa under General Franco's command was flown from Morocco by German-piloted aircraft. The Spanish government, initially unconcerned with the gravity of the uprising, was hesitant to suppress openly the rebellion and naively proclaimed, "Nobody, absolutely nobody in Spain has taken part in this absurd plot."¹ Yet, the international involvement in the war quickly escalated as Franco enlisted the aid of Europe's fascist leaders in Germany, Italy, and Portugal, and the Spanish government turned to the leftist governments of France and the Soviet Union for military and diplomatic support. Each country gauged its level of intervention based on political, ideological, and economic interests. That the axis powers would prevail foretold their intentions of future military aggression while highlighting the weakness of European collective security. This international intervention not only affected Spain's internal and external situation, but also threatened to disrupt and even destroy the governments of her two neighbors, France and Portugal.

As a sister "Popular Front" government, France was

ideologically aligned with the threatened Spanish Republic. Both Léon Blum and Miguel Azaña had similar programs of domestic reform, and France held strong economic ties with Spain by pouring 60% of her entire foreign capital investment in Spanish industry.² Militarily, France was still the strongest power on the continent but felt uncertain of her military preparedness against her traditional enemy, Germany. Blum greatly feared open rivalry between the two countries and sought British support for any potential confrontation. Thus, it was devastating for Blum to learn that London would not support France's desire to support the Spanish Republic, and Blum was pressured to create the unique policy of denying arms to a legitimate government - the policy of nonintervention. France's external position contrasted sharply with the internal dissention that his policy provoked. The French Communist Party refused to abide by Blum's apparent "cowardice" and took charge of forming what would become a legacy of the war, the International Brigades. This division of policy demonstrated the profound influence that France had diplomatically and militarily in the war, yet also reflected a division that showed internal weakness and an inability to confront Europe's rising nationalism. France's desire for European peace created a political schism that was impossible to traverse and prompted a French historian to note: "France may be said to live in a state of perpetual

civil war."3

France's great fear of a fascist state in Spain was matched equally by Portugal's fear of the establishment of a leftist state. The authoritarian regime of Portugal, under the leadership of Antonio Oliveira Salazar, had much to fear from the spread of Spanish anarchy. The Portuguese had historically regarded Spain as the traditional enemy based on Spain's past attempt to unify the peninsula. Any attempt to unify now was particularly alarming to Salazar who fervently rejected any form of leftist political thought. Salazar's crusade prompted drastic military reactions that, like the French Communist Party, greatly affected the outcome of the war. The Portuguese contribution to the war, however, was a strategic one that lacked the heroic, romanticized version of the volunteers recruited by the French Communist Party. Instead, it is the portrayal of an authoritarian government frantically reacting to the perceived spread of communism through internal mobilization and external defiance of its allies. Salazar, unlike Blum, was not willing to accept his oldest ally's refusal to participate in Spain's struggle. Great Britain may have convinced others that peace at any price was desirable, but Salazar countered Britain's policy with the fervor of a nation under siege. Salazar made it clear that Portugal would indeed join the Axis struggle against communism if Great Britain chose to stand idly by. Salazar made no

pretense of hoping to align Portugal under a weak collective security umbrella. He also had the power to quiet internal dissention by authoritarian means and was, therefore, not subject to partisan politics. It was Salazar's defiance of his allies and his resolve to maintain Portugal's independence that placed Portugal in a position of equal, and sometimes superior, strength with her more powerful European neighbors.

These tremendous internal and external changes that the Spanish Civil War brought to France and Portugal are a reflection of the passionate ideology of that era. Spain would come to represent the manifestation of the deep political divisions in Europe, and her war served as a reminder of how fervently each side viewed its political righteousness. While Spain had a unique historical development that manifested itself in modern political problems of land reform, the Church, the role of the military, and regionalism, the extent to which foreign intervention would align and involve so many world powers in Spain's internal affairs was unforeseen. This vast foreign intervention would later be regarded as the precursor to Europe's Second World War, but for now the battle lines were contained on Spanish soil. To understand how Spain became a political microcosm of Europe's ideological divisions, an examination of Spanish pre-war society is explained in light of its international ramifications and how Spain's internal

crisis rapidly spilled over to disrupt the governments of
her neighboring states, France and Portugal.

Chapter I Endnotes

1. Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1943), p. 314.
2. P.A.M. van der Esch, Prelude to War (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1951), p. 16.
3. André Simone, J'Accuse! (New York, New York: Dial Press, 1940), p. 111.

CHAPTER II

"A great European country of civilization
cannot be conquered without the help
of internal disunity"

Clausewitz

For many officers of the Spanish Army in 1936 it seemed that civilization was on the edge of an abyss. Throughout much of the twentieth century, Spain remained historically the same; the accepted form of government was a monarchy, the accepted religion was Roman Catholic, the economy was based on large landed estates with minimum wage laborers, and intervention by the military was an accepted fact of political life. Yet traditional Spain could not isolate itself from the challenges of Europe's industrial modernization and political change. The Russian Revolution of 1917 prompted laborers to take part in direct-action tactics, industrial centers created urban populations that became anti-monarchical, and the Church increasingly lost influence and privilege as society took steps towards de-Christianization. Spain could not ignore nor avoid these changes that consumed her northern neighbors and, in the elections of 1931, the Spanish people handed the reins of government to a coalition of Republicans and Socialists who

felt compelled to begin a social revolution in Spain.

The Second Republic

The Second Republic was launched in April, 1931 as a coalition of Republicans and Socialists who espoused the idealism of revolutionary change. Under the most ideal circumstances it would be difficult for any government to implement the changes that Spanish society faced. But the Popular Front government was not born under ideal circumstances and had to contend with the diverse ideological issues of the 1930's: to the Left, a strong anarchist movement (represented by its union, the Unión de Confederación Nacional de Trabajo), the Communists, (represented by the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista), and the Socialists (represented by its union, the Unión General de Trabajadores). In the Center were the Radical and Progressive parties while on the Right were the Catholics (represented by Acción Popular and its offshoot, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autonomas), the Fascists (represented by the Falangists under José Antonio Primo de Rivera) and the Carlists (advocating the return of the monarchy).

The extreme political divisions demonstrated the social and political cleavages in Spanish society. It was a society that sought relief from many sources of misery and each political camp - fascism, communism, democracy,

socialism, etc - had found a following in Spain. This unstable political situation was particularly focused on how to resolve Spain's struggle with industrialization. Spain still remained an agricultural country where the industrial revolution had only penetrated her northern borders. This meant that Spain had developed a small middle class of merchants and manufacturers and was divided into a high proportion of priests, army officers, and rich landowners on one side facing a majority of poor and illiterate peasants and workers on the other side.

A Polarized Society

These economic cleavages in Spain developed into the class struggle that often seemed inevitable for pre-industrial societies. Whereby Germany and Italy had found unity in industrialization, Spain found disunity. The two sectors of Spain had derived from an "undeveloped, primitive economy"¹ and a polarized society of two mutually fearful, antagonistic coalitions formed. At one end, the peasants and laborers embraced the ideologies of anarchy and socialism that aroused them to take action against their deplorable conditions. The fundamental problem was the need for agrarian reform represented by those in the north who produced only enough for sustenance and those in the south who were landless laborers living in a state of semi-starvation, "... great numbers of these families did not own

any furniture except a cooking pot and ate their meals like animals on the ground."2

Such deplorable conditions led many peasants to immigrate to the north, where the industrial centers became overcrowded and working conditions were equally harsh. Industrialists refused to acknowledge these injustices and "the average worker was so poor that only extreme solutions seemed to have any efficacy to him."3 This accounted for the strong following of anarchism with its fanatical hatred of the Church and a desire to return to the stateless, pueblo life of the past. Less extreme was the Communist Party, followed by the Socialist Party, who, unlike the Anarchists, shared a belief in parliamentary and municipal action. Each party sought to fight the Church, the bourgeoisie, and the Army but their political means were incompatible. The Socialists and Communists worked through the state while the Anarchists wanted to destroy it. This fundamental disagreement would contribute to the future demise of the Popular Front government.

At the other end of the class struggle stood the pillars of Spanish society - the industrialists, the Army, and the Church. Historically, the Church had begun to lose the following of the peasant class in the nineteenth century, following the War of Independence (1808-1813), when it lost a large portion of its land and depended on the state and aristocracy for support. The Church preferred the

riches and political influence of the aristocracy and relied on the state to uphold Christianization. The Church's privileged position allowed it to exert strong political influence through its monopoly on the education system and gained for it the reputation of preferring an alignment with the corrupt ruling and aristocratic classes at the expense of the peasant and working classes. Thus, the Church's self-imposed alienation fostered more than a feeling of indifference among the working class; it was a feeling of scepticism, distrust, and outright hatred.

The power of the Church in political matters was equally matched by the influence of the Army. Its influence over domestic policy outweighed its primary role as an instrument of war, a role that had diminished since Spain's losses in 1898. Spain's humiliating defeat prompted diverse reactions, including a movement towards pacifism; for many, the Army became unpopular, especially among politicians and intellectuals who blamed it for Spain's demise. The Army remained, however, large, top-heavy, and expensive. Spain's economic woes required that the Army step in to keep order when domestic strikes got out of hand, so that the Army was courted by both the government and the industrialists. Another series of international campaigns, this time in Morocco, led the Army to confront King Alfonso XIII and take over the reins of government under Primo de Rivera. This popular Captain General from Cataluña enjoyed immense

success in his first three years (from 1923-1926) as head of state. Thereafter, his popularity began to decline, even among the Army, and he fled the country in 1930. When the Popular Front took over from the dictator in 1931, the Army was still an immense, influential force. It was ill-prepared for maneuvers; money was not available for training and equipment but went instead to the sheer volume of officers. Without adequate funds for training, officers found ways of gaining political influence through their large numbers and were able to exact bribes and threaten local politicians. An idle army, especially a large army, is an unhappy army. Many of Spain's officers found themselves sitting in clubs and cafes discussing and attempting to influence politics. Most of the officers did seem to agree on one thing; the Government was to blame for their current ills and something had to be done to return the Army to its former privileged position.

The third pillar of Spanish society, the industrialists and the landowners, had to contend with a society that was "different" or uniquely Spanish. Economically, Spaniards were essentially anti-capitalist and uncompetitive. This economic profile explains their prolonged agrarian society that only permitted industrialism to move slowly into the country isolated along the periphery. The pervading rural lifestyle meant that the village or pueblo was the center of social and political life. The central government was

distrusted and a strong feeling of separatism and regionalism was found throughout the country. Government was really of little consequence and it seemed that only a violent uprising would display the depth of the peasant's and laborer's grievance. This meant that the lower classes found themselves alternating between political futility and revolution uprisings. The industrial revolution had come too slowly to change this class structuring and without the formation of a middle class, upward mobility was almost nonexistent. The landowners and industrialists became like foreign invaders in their own country and the only solution for the working class seemed to be to expel the invading force that threatened their political and economic development.

Implementing Reform

Spain needed radical reforms. The King had failed to gain support after Primo de Rivera took power and thus the monarchy was temporarily discredited. The Army, also failing to maintain support after Primo de Rivera became unpopular, appeared powerless to halt the advance of leftist influence. With two major pillars of Spanish society temporarily discredited, the elections of 1931 prompted the majority of Spaniards to vote left. The result was a coalition of Socialists and Republicians that formed under Prime Minister Zamora. The new government began the arduous

task of reforming a deeply divided semi-feudal society.

The new constitution began, "Spain is a republic of workers..." and from there the reforms began at a dizzying pace. The first 25 articles of the constitution sought to reverse completely the feudal nature of Spanish society and appeared to leave no traditional pillar of society

untouched:4

- (1) Separation of Church and State
- (2) Legalized divorce
- (3) Elimination of Catholic primary schools
- (4) Reduction of the Army
- (5) Compensated land reform
- (6) Improved working conditions and increased public works programs
- (7) Autonomy granted to Cataluña

Each measure of reform seemed to provoke a crisis or at least develop the potential for a crisis. Granting autonomy to Cataluña threatened a unified Spain, separating Church and state was the first step toward de-Christianization, improved working conditions threatened employers with economic ruin, and any reduction of the military was inviting intervention from the Army. Yet it was the most needed reform, the Agrarian Reform Bill, that created the biggest obstacle to the leftist government. The separation of Church and State had already caused the resignation of Zamora as Prime Minister and Manuel Azaña had taken his

place. Azaña was able to bolster support after quelling the military uprising led by General Sanjurjo in 1932. He had managed to remain prime minister in spite of the dissention of the Church and the revolt of the military but agrarian reform could not be peacefully resolved. Azana's party, the Left Republicans, wanted large estates split into individual holdings while the Socialists wanted to see collectives formed. Neither would compromise and while the Cortes stalled, the government was overwhelmed with boycotts, revolts, and acts of sabotage.

The Left was literally destroying itself as the revolutionary Anarchists continually assaulted the government while the Socialists brought pressure through strikes and mass demonstrations. Additionally, the effects of the world economic crisis of 1929 left Spain in an economic slump, with high unemployment. Azaña attempted to quell this volatile situation with censorship but was still unable to convince the other parties to work with him. When the government fell in September 1933, the prisons were full, unemployment was high, there were constant labor disputes, the small middle class was alienated, the peasants and factory workers were disillusioned, and the Church and the Army were left to seek their own solution to their newly relegated second-class political status.

The Right and Left Alternate Power

The election of November, 1933 reversed Spain's revolutionary spirit and brought in a united coalition of conservative and clerical parties. For the supporters of the Church, their party, C.E.D.A., was headed by Gil Robles under the motto, "Religion, Fatherland, Family, Order, Work, Property."⁵ The majority party, the Radical Republicans, was headed by Alejandro Lerroux who, as Prime Minister, launched a campaign to undo virtually every reform initiated by the previous leftist government (including granting amnesty to the exiled rebel, General Sanjurjo). The Left, still disunited, found each of its parties relying on various tactics to cripple the government. The most revolutionary actions were untaken by the Anarchists who had abstained in both elections while the Socialists, the least reactionary leftist party, were more cooperative, conducting themselves in a manner befitting a party that had just enjoyed three years of national office.

By 1934, the Communists had decided to join forces with the Socialists and conduct a general strike in the northern mining town of Oviedo in Asturias. The strike was a formidable one and government troops, led by General Franco, took two weeks to suppress the rebellion. The brutality of the suppression produced an international outrage as well as a major turn in Spanish politics: the Right was criticized harshly by the Spanish populace and the Left was awakened

from its despondency. The miners had evoked an air of sympathy and the Left found itself again popular among the masses. The conservative government of Lerroux-Robles became less effective and elections were finally called for February, 1936. The atmosphere for these elections was extremely volatile and they would have to be conducted in a deeply polarized society, a society that had become as reactionary as it had segmented.

The Right campaigned under a program of saving Spain from a "Red" insurrection. They were so confident of victory that a panic practically ensued when they lost. With approximately 4,500,000 votes they won only 198 seats versus a vote of 4,300,000 for the Left and 256 seats.⁶ The Popular Front emerged victorious by winning the support of Left Republicans, Socialists, Communists and Anarchists. It was probably the Anarcho-Syndicalists, normally rejecting any form of state participation, that turned the election (although they were not represented in the governing coalition).⁷ President Manuel Azaña again took charge of the government and attempted to calm a deeply divided society by assuring moderate reforms. His precarious situation would probably not have allowed him to do otherwise.

Azaña's moderation was pleasing to no one. Dismissed as too bourgeois, the Socialist Largo Caballero refused to join Azaña's government after the February victory. He

preferred to take a back seat and take over the government when the Popular Front failed. Largo Caballero's actions also split the Socialist party when another leader, Indalecio Prieto, had refused Azaña's offer to become prime minister because of the rift between him and Largo Caballero. While Largo Caballero bided his time and drew plans of what to do if he should assume power, the Right was doing some planning of its own. Gil Robles had already organized the major players of the Right, including Calvo Sotelo of the conservative Nationalists and José Antonio Primo de Rivera of the Falange. Sotelo emphasized the need for unity and welcomed the support of the Carlists (fervent Catholics and monarchists) and the Army. These fanatical political splits were disruptive to President Azaña and his prime minister, Quiroga. That spring, economic disaster also threatened his government due to a rainy winter that affected spring planting and produced high unemployment. It seemed that political and economic chaos were virtually unstoppable and on 16 June, 1936, Gil Robles offered the following alarming statistics as proof of the ineptness of the Popular Front government since its February victory:⁸

Churches burnt	251
Offices, clubs, houses burnt	324
Murders	339
Wounded	1,287

Robberies 134

Strikes 331

There was a general uneasiness that a military revolt would endeavor to bring about some sense of order. The government either chose to ignore the warnings or was too preoccupied with its own leftist 'insurrection' to give credence to any of the threatening rumors. While the majority of the Army under Sanjurjo, Mola, et.al., did indeed plan another historical 'pronunciamiento', the best laid plans were quickly altered when the Socialists masterminded the murder of the conservative leader, Calvo Sotelo, on 13 July. The generals saw that the politicians could no longer maintain law and order and began their assault by hastily launching the rebellion in Spanish Morocco on 17 July.

The 'International' Civil War Begins

There can be no doubt that the initial success achieved by the Nationalists was due not only to the element of surprise but, more importantly, to the weakness of the government. The Republic took the news lightly until it learned the extent of the street fighting and the numbers of military garrisons that had joined the insurgents. With most of the Army joining the rebellion as well as half the Navy and an impressive number of Moroccan troops, Foreign Legion, Civil Guards, Falangists, and Carlist Requetés, the government was forced to examine the gravity of the

situation. While it appeared that the government lacked any professional military force that could stand up to the rebels and that it was unsure of how to prepare its own defense, it still could not foresee a long struggle. After all, the government maintained the industrial centers, the gold reserves, an organized administration and even the stockpile of military maps. All the Republic needed was to resupply her military equipment and organize the remaining remnants of the military along with the worker's militias. It was, however, the Republic's pursuit of arms for her own defense that would be the beginning of the end and would bring about the degree of international involvement in a war, even through a civil war, that could not be contained within Spain's borders.

Over the next three and a half years, it seemed as if most of Europe would anguish over events in Spain. Her class struggle spoke to both the Right and the Left throughout Europe and North America and foretold the intention of Europe's rising nationalism and the fear of confronting its leaders. Spain's tragedy involved Europe from the beginning of the rebellion because of its ideological basis and the need for both sides to seek foreign support. Franco openly enlisted the aid of Germany, Italy, and Portugal whose military regimes he wished to emulate. Conversely, the Republic was dependent on the wavering aid of France, the Soviet Union, and Mexico and

the extent to which these supporters wished to confront the dictators over Spain. No supporter of the Republic ever maintained the resolve of these who aided Franco and the Nationalists. These varying policies of aid to Spain were labeled 'intervention', 'relaxed intervention', and 'nonintervention' and came to affect the balance of power in Europe. Salvador Madariaga explained, "By a tragic coincidence, this war, essentially Spanish, has 'caught on' abroad...even governments outside Spain have been adding fuel to the fire which is consuming our unhappy country. Spain is thus suffering vicariously the latent civil war which Europe is - so far - keeping in check."

Of all the nations that overtly or covertly participated in the war (the International Brigades count 53 participating nations in their rolls), the two countries that felt most threatened by the insurrection were Spain's neighbors, France and Portugal. Germany and Italy hoped to gain a foothold in Spain, but their own stability was not threatened by political events on the Iberian peninsula. Likewise, Great Britain managed to retain some semblance of neutrality in the war because it was unlikely that any repercussion would be felt across the Channel. France and Portugal did not enjoy this geographical luxury nor political stability and found themselves drawn into the war from its inception. Both France and Portugal felt that their national security would be threatened if the 'wrong'

side won the war. France could not afford to have a fascist state in Spain that would likely align itself in time of war with France's traditional enemy, Germany. Likewise, Portugal could not allow the establishment of a leftist, communist state that would no doubt swallow up the Iberian peninsula. The war came to represent more than the ideological struggle of Right and Left when it was soon apparent that Spain threatened the survival of both governments. The reactions of both nations would have vast internal repercussions that greatly altered their capacity to govern. The external repercussions would be that these two nations virtually determined the course of events in Spain's 'international' Civil War.

Chapter II Endnotes

1. Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), p. 87.
2. Ibid., p. 121.
3. P.A.M. van der Esch, Prelude to War (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1951), p. 5.
4. Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Civil War (Boston: DC Heath and Co., 1967), p. viii.
5. Raymond Carr, The Spanish Civil War (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1977) p. 23.
6. David Catell, Communism and the Spanish Civil War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 35.
7. Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth, p. 298.
8. G.M. Gathorne Hardy, "The Spanish Situation Reviewed" (International Affairs, May 1937), p. 407.
9. Jackson, The Spanish Civil War, p. 54.

CHAPTER III

"(If) Italy and Germany continue their aggression in Spain and neither France nor the UK see their way to prevent this continued intervention, in the name of what morality and justice can you go on depriving the legal Spanish Government of its rights under international national law?"

Spanish Foreign Minister del Vayo

Léon Blum, Premier of the ruling Popular Front coalition in France, was meeting with a teachers' delegation when he was brought Spanish Prime Minister Giral's telegraph on 19 July telling him of the pronunciamiento. The news had been made public that afternoon in the Paris-Midi and many were surprised that the Premier was so belatedly informed. Spain had immediately turned to France when it was left without a stable means of military control or arms and found itself in a helter-skelter rush to procure material. Giral's request was viewed by Blum as a simple administrative matter since legally, France had signed an arms agreement with Spain in 1935 and ideologically, France was bound to support a fraternal Popular Front government. Blum agreed to fill the request and informed the Republic's representative, Fernando de los Rios, that the technicality of cabinet approval would be received within the next day or

two so that Spain's request could be legally and "fraternally" honored.

Blum summoned Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos, Minister of National Defense Edouard Daladier, and Air Minister Pierre Cot. Spain's Civil War was another crisis for which the newly elected government would have to find an acceptable solution. France had been experiencing internal divisions and like Spain, it underwent vast changes with its own Popular Front government; a 40 hour work week, vacations with pay, a nationalized armaments industry, and various programs to improve benefits for labor. Yet, the government remained besieged with labor and economic problems. Strikes were weakening the government while the devaluation of the franc was crushing the economy. In the midst of the economic and social turmoil was the internal political division that spilled over into the foreign policy arena. The Left wanted closer ties with Russia to balance the growth of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The Moderates wanted a strong alliance with Great Britain while partisans on the Right considered the Franco-Soviet Pact of May 1935 deplorable and wanted a rapprochement with Germany and Italy. To the extreme Right were those who preferred Hitler over Stalin or even Blum.¹

A Division of Political Zealots

The influence of the Rightist parties in France, known as the Front National, was unabashedly anti-Marxist and neo-pacifistic. The Front National made no pretense in its dislike of the Popular Front government but they were able to temper their political zealousness by the presence of the moderate Radical Socialists in the government. Led by Vice Premier Chautemps, the Right knew that any revolutionary social experiments introduced by the government would be tempered by Chautemps.

The Right did not hold back its criticism of Blum's government when a large number of strikes broke out in May and June. The strikes were an obvious representation of bolshevist turmoil and fueled the Right's mistrust of the Communists. As the ideological war in Europe gained momentum, the two camps of fascism and bolshevism were represented in the French government. The Right refused to be conciliatory to the Communists and voiced its intense dislike of the Third International's influence. In proclaiming his mistrust of the Communists and the recently signed Franco-Soviet Pact, one Deputy flatly stated, "We will accept the Franco-Soviet Pact when there are no longer seventy-two Russian deputies in the benches of the French Chamber."²

The press was as sharply divided as the government in its political ideologies. Objectivity was not the rule by which the press functioned and editorials were blatant in their support of a rapprochement with Italy and Germany or a crusade against Fascism. This basic division in France was expressed by the Socialist Deat who said, "If France seems to be the ally of Fascism, half of the people at least will not march. If France becomes the soldier of Stalin, the other half will not want to have anything to do with it."³

The ideological differences in France were then sharply divided and were reflected in the government, the press, and the streets. Yet the division was not so deep as to render France ungovernable, and by July it almost seemed as if Blum had his labor, economic, and political problems under control. A correspondent wrote to London:

"July 14th... the Front Populaire has become a mystique, a union of Socialism and Nationalism in which most of the population rejoices to feel that democratic France is reborn. So overwhelming is this spirit today, that the Blum government could do almost anything it wished."⁴

The Blum government, however, was strongly divided on what it wished for Spain. Blum's position was clear-cut: arms and planes for Spain. He was supported by Cot but found Delbos and Deladier more fearful of international complications. And then the news was leaked. It is not

clear how the news was leaked to the reactionary French press. Geoffrey Warner writes that the chargé d'affaires at the Spanish Embassy in Paris, Cristobal de Castillo, was a Nationalist sympathizer and told L'Action Française and L'Echo de Paris on 23 July of the arms request.⁵ However, a French historian and author of Blum's biography, Jean LaCouture, states that it was the Spanish ambassador Cardenas who, upon finding out that Blum would fill the arms request, resigned on the 22nd of July and informed Charles Corbin, the French ambassador to London and the right-wing Parisian press.⁶ While it is not known exactly when Corbin was alerted, it is known that he called Blum on 21 July and expressed his and London's concern over the proposed aid. Blum was not prepared to alienate London and hoped that a solution would meet London's approval as well as the French press. Blum confided to Cot that French aid would somehow find its way to Spain, "je maintendrai ma position à tout prix, et malgré tous les risques, nous devons aider cette Espagne qui nous est amie."⁷

While Blum's cabinet debated ideological differences, Giral sent another telegram, "... we beg you to come to an understanding with us immediately for supplying arms and planes."⁸ Franco had long since contacted Germany and Italy and Italian intervention of personnel and German intervention of aircraft were swift. President LeBrun and

Delbos were still hesitant but arrangements for the aid were begun and Blum wired back to Giral, "... we will lose Abyssinia but we will save Spain."⁹ Spain's Civil War was quickly becoming anything but a civil war as the U.S.S.R. announced strong support for the Republic but only in words. Stalin was hesitant to intervene openly because he knew the strong anti-communist positions of the French and British Right. He, therefore, began with words of support and the promise of worker's contributions for Spanish relief. While European governments intervened, debated, and promised, the first news of the people's call to arms became public when French authorities seized an automobile allegedly carrying ammunition to Spain.¹⁰

Giral was kept waiting while Delbos and Blum flew to London to attend the Anglo-Franco-Belgian Conference that had been previously scheduled for discussions about the Rhineland. They were accompanied by Alexis Léger, (Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office) and René Massigli (Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs). It was Léger who spoke so convincingly to Blum of the dangers of losing British cooperation. Ambassador Corbin again reminded Blum of the pro-Nationalist sentiment he felt was prevalent in the British cabinet. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden informed Blum that Britain would remain neutral, basing their actions on the assumptions that

the dictators were satisfied with the Rhineland and Abyssinia. Blum did not commit himself one way or another but his greatest fear was expressed by Churchill to Ambassador Corbin, "[If France intervenes] the ruling forces here will agree with Germany and Italy and they will move away from France."¹¹ Now Blum had to consider not only British alienation, but a possible war with Italy and Germany, as well as hostile public reaction. As he prepared to leave London on 24 July, Eden pressed him for an answer to whether France would supply arms to Spain. Blum, in spite of overwhelming pressure against it, responded affirmatively. Eden warned him, "That's your affair. I simply ask you one thing - please be careful."¹²

While Blum was in London, French planes were being prepared for shipment to Spain in spite of the public denial by the French government. The government was quick to point out that Spain had ordered French aircraft six months previously so the French factories were within their rights to expedite delivery. This, however, did not seem to calm the storm of the French press nor the members of parliament who were very worried about France's role in a neighboring civil war. The press reacted as emotionally as the members of parliament and accused the government of being "criminal," "abominable," and even threatened, "we will never forgive you for this crime."¹³

The Dilemma of Aiding Spain

Spain had now pushed France into a dilemma. For the Right, the political choices represented in aiding Spain were clear: Berlin or Moscow. The nations of Europe were being forced to choose between the ideologies which these cities represented and France could no longer place her hopes in Geneva's lap of collective security. The Right continued to express its rejection of a Soviet alliance and since France felt militarily inferior to Germany (42 million French against 76 million Germans), cooperation with Great Britain seemed to be the only solution. It seemed that Germany was once again forcing France to act. Peace and security became the gospel of the Right and the campaign to preserve France, even at the cost of losing a legitimate government in Spain, was pushing the Right into a frenzy of dissent against Spanish aid.

When Blum returned to Paris on 24 July at 7 p.m., he was determined to maintain his position of support for Spain. Unaware of the explosive political and civil reaction of proposed aid to Spain, Blum was met at the airport by Vice-Premier Chautemps. Chautemps informed Blum of the dissention in the government and of the strong reactions by the press. By 10 p.m., Blum had assembled Cot, Delbos, Daladier, Finance Minister Auriol, and de los Rios at his home. They agreed to sell the aircraft that Spain

desperately needed based on the 1935 treaty. The plan was for the Potez aircraft to be flown to Perpignan and the Spaniards would then fly them across the border. The ministers worked well into the morning, terminating the meeting with the agreement that they were doing what was legally and ideologically correct. Now it was up to the partisans of the Right to prevent Blum from taking action for Spain - action that would only result in a threat to France's security.

On 25 July, de los Rios went to the Potez offices to find that the situation, thanks to the French Rightist press, was out of control. The Potez officials could not bring themselves to cooperate, explaining "the pressure is enormous."¹⁴ The French press was raging because "spies" from L'Action Française had discovered twenty Potez aircraft at Mondesir airport, topped off and ready to go.¹⁵ Air minister Cot became the prime target of their alarm and headlines shrieked of impending war, "Cot the Murderer!" and "Cot-la-guerre!"¹⁶

Meanwhile, Blum saw President LeBrun who sided with the pacifists and relayed his fear concerning the potential arms delivery. Blum was desperate to gain support for aid to Spain. Hoping to convince the Radical Socialists of the rightness of his policy, Blum met with Herriot, the President of the Chamber of Deputies. Herriot, in spite of

their friendship, could not be convinced and he affectionately told Blum, "Ah, I beg you, mon petit, don't stick your nose into it."¹⁷

Later that day, de los Rios came to see Blum about the Potez difficulties. Now the British were threatening France's support to Spain as Blum relayed that Prime Minister Baldwin had gone over his head and directly told President Lebrun that Great Britain would remain neutral if a war occurred over France's decision to intervene. It was then that Blum confessed the much quoted, "My soul is torn," but he vowed that France would aid Spain, no matter what the cost and potential for conflict.

A cabinet meeting had been previously arranged for 4 p.m. The leader of the opposition to Spanish aid was no less than Vice-Premier Chautemps. The cabinet discussed all the aspects of the foreign intervention in Spain: France wanted a Soviet-free Republican Spain, Germany and Italy wanted to keep Soviet influence away from the Mediterranean, Britain wanted to keep her maritime routes open, and Portugal did not want a Leftist government sharing her border. It seemed that any French support would somehow upset the balance one way or another, but then there was the legal problem with the French and Spanish treaty... Blum convinced the Cabinet that an attempt at deception was the best solution for avoiding direct confrontation with Germany

and Italy. Shipping arms involved too many external and internal risks for the government, so arms shipments would become the responsibility of private manufacturers. A communiqué was released, stating that the government was unanimous in its decision not to intervene. Blum and Delbos personally reiterated to parliament that the government would not ship any arms, "le gouvernement français refusait d'accorder à la demande de Madrid."¹⁸

The press openly scoffed at the absurdity of the communiqué and spent the next few days trying to disprove the government's statement. It is not clear whether the press ever uncovered the exact route through which the government was covertly working. It was a cabinet minister, Pierre Cot, who became the chief organizer of shipping these private arms via Mexico. Thomas wrote that from this meeting onward, "the Spanish Embassy in Paris had people entering all hours of the day and night offering arms, munitions, and aircraft."¹⁹ Since the French government was concerned about the direct intervention of Germany and Italy, on 29 July the French Ambassador to Rome, Chambrun, called on the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano, to discuss the possibility that Italy might terminate its aid to the Republic. Ciano was not convinced of France's sincerity and remained sceptical about alleged "unofficial" French aid to Spain. The next day, however, the French Left was rewarded

with visual confirmation of Italy's intervention when two of six Italian seaplanes crashed in French Morocco.

This was the opportunity that Blum and the Left had been waiting for. The French people would not stand back and permit another Italian assault on a legitimate government. A foreign affairs policy debate took place in the Chamber of Deputies on 31 July. Delbos spoke eloquently on behalf of the Spanish government and tried to diminish the French government's assistance to the Spanish Republic. Delbos, however, did not state that the French government had not assisted Spain and that was not what the deputies wanted to hear. It then became impossible for Delbos to convince them that France should aid the legitimate government of Spain. To the deputies, Blum's cabinet had already taken the liberty of threatening national security by indirect intervention and they conveyed to Delbos that such aid must be stopped.

An Appeal for Nonintervention

Blum's cabinet was not swayed by the Chamber and at a meeting on 1 August, they again resolved to provide material. Delbos was more cautious. He had begun to feel the potential upheaval and suggested that perhaps France should appeal to other European nations to adopt some form of nonintervention. The cabinet was divided but Delbos's

suggestion was adopted under one important condition: that France could provide aid to Spain if the other powers violated the proposed agreement. A communiqué was released on 2 August appealing to the principal European powers not to intervene in Spain. What happened the next week while France waited for the solicited responses was indicative of the government's division; Delbos frantically worked to find an acceptable agreement for all the powers involved, Cot and Daladier worked to get arms to the Republic before an agreement was reached, and Blum could see no alternative but to resign.

It was Delbos's official communiqué of nonintervention that brought to light the fear of the political split that Blum wanted to avoid. The Right had constantly warned that France's best interests would be served in the form of neutrality. They knew that Blum and the Left could not possibly support Franco so that the best solution would be to withhold arms to the Republic. If Germany and the Soviet Union wanted to intervene then they could fight it out amongst themselves but France's security rested in supporting an objective policy of nonintervention.

Blum knew he was compelled to react in the interest of peace but he also felt compelled to honor his words of support. While France officially waited for affirmation from the dictators, 'unofficial' support to the Republic

began in earnest. Deladier and Cot worked quickly to get supplies and aircraft through to Spain, particularly via Mexico. Bell states that 50 aircraft were shipped to the Republic before nonintervention became official on 7 August and a significant amount of other war material crossed the frontier.²⁰ It seems either incorrect or perhaps misquoted that one historian states he received a letter from a member of the Spanish Cortes who called French aid "only a few drops of armament [that] filtered through the Pyreanean control curtain."²¹ Blum, Cot, and Deladier, however, were firmly committed to getting even a trickle of arms though the closely watched frontier. Blum was not, however, without the torment of a man divided between following personal commitments and public obligations.

Blum worried about public opinion and was made aware by the French press that his own political survival depended on his handling of foreign policy. Blum warned about "political" opinion from his own cabinet and members of parliament. The Right seemed only concerned that war be averted at all costs while the Socialists and Communists on the Left threatened him with bringing down his government for not aiding a legitimate ally. Chautemps later wrote, "Shaken by deep resistance of Parliament, realizing that one could not conduct a foreign action without the support of the entire nation, [Blum] regretfully decided in favor of

nonintervention."²² Blum could not possibly risk a break-up of the Front Populaire government over Spain. His son, Robert, reflected that Blum's choice was not between intervention and nonintervention but between nonintervention and the fall of the government. Blum's words during this personal crisis ring of a man who had resigned himself to the sway of public opinion, "... if I do anything that risks bringing France into a war it would be said that I did it for no other reason than to defend the Reds in Spain."²³

London, Rome, and Berlin were all approached with France's proposal but suspicion of each other prevented them from reacting. While the powers debated the French initiative, France decided to help them speed up their reaction by declaring the 'neutral' action of allowing French volunteers to cross the border and volunteer for either side. Communists Thorez and Jouhaux began to campaign openly and in declaring that there could be no neutrality for the conscientious worker, they continued to collect funds for Spain. Cot continued to ship aircraft and did so as long as he remained in office (June 1937). According to Cot's guidance, Republican aircraft continued to land at French airports by 'errors of navigation.' Blum remained torn by the political and public division over Spain and wanted to resign. It was de los Rios who ultimately convinced him that Spain needed a friendly

government on her border. It was here that Blum and de los Rios openly wept in frustration, an event that would occur more than once during Blum's tenure and that would lead Blum's cabinet to contemplate his ability to see himself through this crisis.

Nonintervention was proposed to the British on 2 August, to the Italians on 3 August, and to the Germans on 4 August. The Germans pointed out that the Soviet Union should be included and so they were approached on 5 August. The Soviet Union then proposed that Portugal be included. Delbos, in hoping to quickly work out an agreement, accepted all of these proposals. Now a game of "wait and see" was begun as only Great Britain officially approved the policy on 5 August. The Soviet Union was also reluctant to follow but France, hoping by an act of good faith to move the others, issued a communique' on 8 August that stated it would abide by the nonintervention policies. This was quite risky since Italy and Germany had not given the slightest indication of a favorable reply. It was now only France and Great Britain that accepted (1) a ban on all exports of war material to Spain, (2) a ban on all orders that had been placed and (3) agreement by all Powers to keep each other informed of the measures being taken. Pierre Cot summed up Blum's reaction to French adherence of the nonintervention policy without Italian or German approval, "The idea

revolted Blum."²⁴ Blum's actions also disgusted some of his colleagues. One socialist minister, appalled by the display of weakness on 7 August predicted, "This is the end. It means in reality the resignation of the Blum cabinet. Oh, I know outwardly it is continuing in office. But the Blum government you have known is gone. From now on it is different. When we came into office, a new era had begun for France. Today it is ended. We're going back to the old days."²⁵

The French cabinet appeared very naïve in agreeing to this proposal without the dictators' agreement. The reason most cited by analysts and personal accounts for this apparent weakness was British pressure. Micaud also adds that fear of Germany was a fundamental factor that had long influenced French politics and now compelled them to turn to Great Britain. France, in its fear to stand up against Germany "had in many ways, the psychology of a defeated nation."²⁶ Of course, at that time it was impossible for France to see the path that the Civil War would take and it believed that cutting off arms to both sides could only shorten the conflict. Blum resigned himself to his fate but added that it was not only England that pushed him to surrender his principles. Blum realized that whatever France did for Spain, the dictators could do more, "so nonintervention was essentially an attempt to prevent others

from doing what we were incapable of accomplishing."27 Blum showed that he was not completely turning his back on his conscience because it was during that fateful cabinet meeting that Cot was in constant contact with the Paris airport telling them to speed up the departure of 13 planes headed for Spain. Blum knew that everytime an assistant to Cot entered with a piece of paper that another plane had left. It is noteworthy that Blum drew out discussions for 4 1/2 hours, from 4 p.m. to 8:30 p.m., until the 13th plane departed for the Republic.

Nonintervention was a method for France and England to keep peace with the dictators. Chaumpey stated that the Nonintervention Agreement was "above all, a means of avoiding open conflict with the Fascist Powers."28 It was no secret that Britain's Anthony Eden felt the same as Chaumpey, and as early as 8 August, the London press was predicting, " This neutrality will evidently be one-sided."29 Blum and his cabinet were, of course, uneasy about the delays in responding to the nonintervention communiqué. The break did not come until 21 August when Italy formally accepted the agreement, followed by the U.S.S.R. on 23 August and Germany on 24 August. Now that the agreement had been reached, the obvious was missing - a means of enforcement.

Blum would be forced to confront the dictators, this

time hoping to reach a gentleman's agreement that nonintervention would be adhered to. In France, Blum was experiencing an outpouring of protest from the Left as the Communists headed a campaign to convince the government to change its position on nonintervention. At a mass meeting on 3 September at the Place de la Republique, crowds chanted "des avions pour L'Espagne!"³⁰ One critic of nonintervention proclaimed, "It is Blum who saved Franco." Blum practically agreed with him and confided to a cabinet member, "they are going to say horrible things about me and they will be right, but neither can I carry my country into an adventure which could cause another frightful tragedy ... [France] is necessarily compelled to be in agreement with Great Britain."³¹ Blum then confronted another hostile crowd at Luna Park on 6 September, however by the time he finished his speech, he had won their understanding and support. Blum told the crowd that he would stand by the Nonintervention Agreement until incontrovertible evidence of violations could be produced. At that point, ironically he need have looked no further than the violations already undertaken by his determined cabinet.

The French next proposed the establishment of a Nonintervention Committee and on 9 September the first meeting was called in London. It was Germany that pushed for the meeting site to be in London instead of Paris,

presumably because Italy and Germany both repeatedly accused France of a lack of sincerity. Portugal refused to even attend the meeting, also based on alleged French violations. But it was only Portugal that held out and a surprising assembly of 26 nations attended the first meeting (in comparison to Paris' original suggestion of Italy, France, and Great Britain). This control committee became officially known as "The International Committee for Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain."

The first meeting was perhaps indicative of how ineffective the committee would be over the next 30 months. Germany began the dissention by stipulating that it would remain a member of the committee provided that the committee remained only a consultative body. The others disagreed on initial proposals and when the vote was taken regarding France's proposals, only 15 countries agreed. Of the remaining 11 dissenting countries, Germany and Italy were most notably against France. It seemed that France was now responsible for creating a control committee that had no means to enforce its decisions. Blum's good faith in the dictators was now turning into an obvious sham from which there was no apparent retreat.

France's proposal of nonintervention was particularly bitter to Loyalist Spaniards and the Left in Europe because

Italian and German aid had actually increased after that first Committee meeting. Stalin was displeased with the apparent ineffectiveness of the Committee and his support of nonintervention was withdrawn when the head of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, flew to see him on 21 September. Stalin, unlike Blum, refused to stand by and hope that the dictators would suddenly change course. He would be faithful to the agreement as long as they were. Stalin and Thorez made arrangements for import-export teams to be established in Paris, London, and Zurich. Thorez then suggested the idea of raising an international volunteer force that would be the chief recipient of any Soviet aid to Spain. Soviet aid would then be assured of falling into reliable party-member hands. The cost of Soviet aid did not come cheaply and may have served to discolor the myth that the majority of volunteers were ideological zealots who spontaneously answered Spain's call for help. Stalin wanted Spain's gold reserve shipped to the U.S.S.R. as security: the fourth largest gold reserve in the world, worth about \$800 million. Stalin's demands were met and 70% of the gold plus certain raw materials were shipped to Odessa in October. The remaining 30% was shipped to Paris for safekeeping.

The Response of Foreign Volunteers

Now the French Communists could began recruiting foreign volunteers in earnest. Since the outbreak of the war, the presence of foreign volunteers had been verified but exaggerated in numbers. Initially, foreigners already living in Spain, or those who could cross the border, quickly joined up. It is estimated that only about 1,000 foreign volunteers were fighting before the formal establishment of the International Brigades in October, 1936.³² The French provided a significant share of those early volunteers who were formed under the "Commune de Paris" centuria, commanded by Jules Dumont, an ex-Army officer. While much speculation arose as to the actual number of those first French volunteers, the actions of one early French participant, André Malraux, were duly noted by both sides. Malraux arrived in Spain four days after the rebellion and quickly returned to France to persuade Blum to provide material. Malraux worked with Blum's cabinet under the impending, deadline of the Nonintervention Agreement. Malraux's brother-in-law knew personnel at Potez and together, with Cot, they managed to ship 34 planes to the Republic. On the day of the fateful French cabinet meeting, 8 August, Malraux's planes landed at Madrid's Baraja's airfield. Malraux was made a 'coronel' by the Republic and took command of his wing of foreign flyers, the Escadre España.

Malraux watched the Republic struggle until October, when he noted Soviet aid began to improve the situation. It appeared that the days of frustration of dealing with Cot and Blum would soon be over. France's initial assistance had trickled to a halt and Blum even refused, in late August, to allow new American aircraft, already purchased by the Republic, to leave the airport at Toulouse. Malraux and his air force now stood beside the formal French Communist Party's establishment of foreign volunteers, all dependent on the Soviet Union from Albacete, Spain. Malraux reflected on his own important role in aiding the struggling Republic, "Then there was the Spanish Civil War and I went to fight in Spain. Not with the International Brigade - it didn't yet exist, and it was we who gave it the time to exist: the Communist Party was still thinking it over."³³

From September to October, from Thorez's Moscow trip to the establishment of the command base at Albacete, France was the source of a major recruiting drive for volunteers. The main headquarters was established at the Maison des Syndicats at No. 8 Rue Mathurin-Moreau, Paris and soon afterward, similar offices were established throughout the city. André Marty, a Communist and member of the Chamber of Deputies, ran the Maison and was assisted by Czech Communist Clement Goltwald and Italian Communist Palmiro Togliatti. They established two departure bases: one at Marseilles for

recruits going by sea and one at Perpignan for those going by land. A receiving center was also established in Figueras, Spain for those crossing the Pyrenees from France. Another Italian, Luigi Longo was then given the mission of finding a base in Spain from which all volunteers could initially train. Albacete was finally chosen, based on its position of being along the main rail lines between Madrid and Valencia.

Paris had become the marshaling yard for volunteers of all nationalities. Many volunteers reflected on their arrival to Paris and their enlistment processing as proof that many French government officials chose their political conscience over their government loyalty. Nick Gillain, a Belgian, went through the induction process in Paris with about 500 other volunteers. They received identity documents covered with official stamps and were given new Spanish names. Gillain was told to tell the border guards that he could not speak Spanish because he left the country when he was a baby. Upon arriving at the Gare du Nord, volunteers were escorted to nondescript hotels where a network kept them informed of any suspicious police interest. Americans in particular did not like this "shadowy" existence and specifically resented having their possessions confiscated by the French Communist Party. The Party, however, felt it was in the volunteer's best interest

if he could disguise his intentions and so a standard border-crossing outfit was devised. For example, every volunteer received the same kind of imitation-leather suitcase. American John Gates remarked, "The French customs inspectors took one look at our suitcases and our fleece lined coats and congratulated us."³⁴

French officials seemed to look the other way as the volunteers blatantly crossed the frontier. Train #27 left the Quai d' Orsay Station in Paris and arrived in Perpignan the next day. It was known as "The Train of the Volunteers" or "The Red Express," and there was no secrecy on the train ride. Frenchmen sang wildly, hanging out the windows and shouting the International. Observing compatriots returned the salute while local gendarmes turned their backs to the whole affair. Upon crossing the frontier, the French border guards asked no embarrassing questions. Some even smiled and gave the salute.

The recruiting centers in Paris were becoming choked with people whose intentions were not always for ideological purposes - unemployed, adventurers, mercenaries, writers, poets, communists and working men came. André Malraux recounted, "On one occasion all the hobos of Lyon set out to join the Brigade.. only to be stopped at the frontier."³⁵ The focal point for these men was the town of Albacete. The first 500 volunteers, mostly Frenchmen, arrived at Albacete

between 10-14 October, 1936. Upon their arrival they were met by an almost all French cadre; André Marty was the Commander of the base and Luigi Longo the Inspector General. Training was completely in French hands with a Frenchman named Gayman ("Vidal" in Spain), a communist municipal counselor from Paris in command and his senior NCO, a Frenchman known as Commander Jean Marie.

Upon arrival the volunteers were addressed by Marty. Apparently he was not an impressive individual in appearance or words. An Englishman described Marty's welcoming speech:

"(we've been) waiting about for the next bit of grub. Then they've started some jolly game of hauling ourselves out at six in the morning to go on parade and listen to some fat bastard gassing his head off in some language we don't understand."36

It seemed that no one was complimentary of Comrade Marty, often wondering how he became appointed commander of the base. Supposedly based on his military knowledge, it seems it was more of a "political" appointment. Marty had been well known in the Communist Party since he participated in an uprising in the Black Sea in 1919, and somehow Marty managed to stay in favor with Stalin. Hugh Thomas describes Marty as "arrogant, incompetent and cruel."37 A German correspondent had this to say of Marty:

"...it is not so easy to turn a mutinous NCO into the commander of an army. Marty covered his forgivable inadequacy with an unforgivable passionate spyhunt; he was genuinely convinced that many of the volunteers who came to his headquarters were Fascist spies. (Marty maintained) his peace of mind by promptly liquidating doubtful cases rather than harm the Republic by 'petty bourgeois indecision.'".³⁸

Marty did apparently authorize a number of brutal executions, for which he was to earn the name "Le Boucher de Albacete."³⁹ By the time the Brigades were withdrawn in October 1938, Marty would have assassinated over 500 of his own volunteers, or one tenth of the total number of volunteers killed in the war. "To Marty, the enemy was more inside the International Brigades and Republican territory than on the other side of the lines," said one French Communist who worked for him.⁴⁰ The volunteers were restless and openly rebellious and saw no reason to render salutes or obey a chain of command. The French, more so than any other nation, were labeled as too individualistic, and were said to have had a seamy side to them - more so than the other battalions. Perhaps their barracks were indicative of this barb. Their barracks stood next to the Germans' where signs were tacked up exclaiming "We Exalt Discipline."⁴¹ The French, however, joined against another

fight and tacked up posters proclaiming the fight against venereal disease. Yet, life for the French volunteer was not a drunken brawl in the Brigades. If they had a reputation for playing hard, they were also punished harder. The English, some of them assigned to the French Battalion, were surprised at French "justice" and explained that the British did not agree with the five-day lock-up without a hearing. "A hearing?," the Frenchman said laughing, "But a drunken man can't talk sense when he's tight and can't remember much the next day - what's the use of giving him a hearing?"⁴²

While Marty was organizing his ground forces, André Malraux was still negotiating over aircraft for his España Squadron. He moved his headquarters to Albacete but was not under Marty's command, and so in typical pilot fashion, he located himself at the Regina Hotel. Malraux did give the appearance, however, of a dutiful Party member when he would appear every afternoon at Marty's bullring speeches. While Marty spoke, he would discreetly inquire who among the group had pilot or mechanic experience. Once indentified, they were escorted to the Regina Hotel where Malraux would enlist them.

Political Futility in London

While these French rebels organized the Republic's first volunteer air and ground forces, the French government continued to participate in the futile sessions in London. October was filled with allegations and denials as each country resolutely swore to the Agreement. The Soviet Union seemed to be the only honest representative in the sessions, as it admitted that it would not consider itself bound to the Agreement to any greater extent than the others. This declaration was made on 23 October, two days before the Spanish gold shipment reached Odessa. On 2 November, the Committee met again and agreed that its status of "consultative body" was ineffective and that some system of supervision must be created. While the Committee worked to place observers that could report violations, the main concern of the committee, the International Brigades, prepared to move into their first battle, the Battle for Madrid.

The Battle for Madrid was also taking effect on the political front. Paris continued to stand by the Nonintervention Agreement in spite of the complaints about Italy and Germany that were decried by the French Left. Events in November had been unnerving - Mussolini had

proclaimed the Rome-Berlin Axis and on 18 November, Mussolini and Hitler both acknowledged the government of General Franco as the legal government of Spain. The French Left was very frustrated at the obvious violations occurring in Spain and on 29 November, Thorez openly threatened to go against the government for the first time. Delbos and Blum restated that nonintervention succeeded in lessening the tension in Europe. Thorez was sceptical and told Blum he could no longer support Blum's policies. When a vote of confidence was held on 5 December, Thorez felt he could not bring down the government and so the Communists abstained. The final vote was 350 for and 171 against the Agreement.⁴³ Again Blum responded by threatening to resign but was persuaded to continue.

Blum and Delbos may have been keeping the members of the government reassured of France's neutral position but they were more confrontational in London. Throughout December's meetings they voiced many complaints about the increase in volunteers. Delbos met with the German ambassador for an understanding about the number of "armed tourists" flocking to Spain.⁴⁴ The British government was informed that France was tired of being made to look foolish by the ineffectiveness of the Committee. France's position as "champion" of nonintervention would have to be

modified if the Agreement was to be effective.⁴⁵ Together, France and England then proposed that a ban be placed on all volunteers — few responses ensued.

The beginning of 1937 saw battles waging on all fronts — Spain, London, Geneva, and Paris. The Internationals continued fighting in the heaviest battles of the war — Madrid, Jarama, and Guadalajara. In Jarama, the Andre Marty Battalion was slaughtered when it exhausted its ammunition. By the spring of 1937, probably 70% of the volunteers who fought at Madrid in November and December were either in hospitals or graves.⁴⁶ Complaints about life in the Brigades were beginning to increase.

Politically, France upheld the London Committee's proposal on volunteers and passed a bill on 11 January that would prohibit them from leaving France. That same month, the Nonintervention Committee won its first victory as France agreed that observers could be placed along the border and on ships headed for Spain. The Committee also finally agreed to set a date for the banning of volunteers, 20 February, but again the problem was one of enforcement.

Meanwhile, the Internationals were still in the midst of the worst fighting. Replacements were getting more scarce, perhaps due to France closing the border in

February, perhaps due to the harsh circumstances of war that must have become known through deserters and the press. Johnston states that the military discipline of the Brigades was weak. With no time to achieve cohesion, they were thrown into the fight, barely knowing the name of the man next to them. With so many nationalities, politics, and distinct military practices, it is not surprising that some nationalities were more popular than others. It seems that the French were not highly thought of and one volunteer referred to them as "the eternally grumbling French."⁴⁷ The España Squadron was also having its share of troubles during the month of February. Malraux's men had decided that his bravery was so inspiring that they insisted over Malraux's wishes, in renaming the squadron the Escadre André Malraux. February was their last battle, however, as his six remaining and badly scarred Potez aircraft went up against the enemy's new Fiat flyers and lost. Those who were left and wanted to remain went to fight with the Republic. Malraux's bravery was noted by many and it seemed curious that this small French air force would remain so independent of any other chain of command. Malraux explained that he always fought to remain independent because he was convinced that the planes would then be sure to arrive from France.

In March the Nonintervention Committee was able to draft a resolution for the observation scheme. It was to be an expensive proposal of which France agreed to finance a hefty 16% of the cost. The first year's estimate was £900,000.⁴⁸ It was decided that 130 British observers would patrol the Spanish-Portuguese border, another 130 undetermined observers would patrol the Franco-Spanish border and 5 more observers would patrol the Spanish - Gibraltar border. The Spanish coasts were divided into zones for naval operations by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Paris did not believe that this would impede Italy and on 24 March, Delbos met with British and German ambassadors to discuss Italy's outright refusal to withdraw its volunteers. Delbos countered with threatening to open the French border — a threat that was to surface many times in the future.

Internal and International Weakness

The summer of 1937 was vicious in combat, ineffective around the committee table, and demoralizing for Léon Blum. Beset with economic problems, he and his cabinet saw no alternative but to resign. His days in office had been exactly one year and two weeks and must have seemed at least

ten times that. Blum was succeeded by the Radical Socialist Chautemps, who had made his nonintervention position quite clear regarding Spain. The new president of the Spanish Republic, Juan Negrin visited Chautemps in June and asked that he put an end to this nonintervention nonsense. Chautemps gravely explained that French reliance on Great Britain prevented this.⁴⁹ Events in London verified Chautemps' position and when Italy and Germany decided to withdraw from the naval patrols Britain and France were left to carry out the plan. France assumed responsibility for the entire Mediterranean and at this point, it appeared that France and Great Britain would carry alone the burden of nonintervention. In July, Mussolini accused France of never having respected the withdrawal of volunteers, agruing that the agreement was so complicated that it was impossible to achieve. He claimed that nonintervention was "A Fable for Fools" with Great Britain and France doing all they could for the Republic "... the decisive word now belongs to the guns."⁵⁰

This was not the first encounter France would have with the Duce that summer. Many accusations would occur causing deadlocks in the Committee on naval patrols, observation patrols, and withdrawing volunteers. The press was getting particularly wary of the ineffectiveness of the

Committee, "The Committee continues to meet with faithful regularity in London; 'adjournment' is the publicly announced method of progression."⁵¹ Paris requested a conference be held so that the Mediterranean countries could protect their shipping since the waters around Spain had become more threatening. Again Italy was recalcitrant, stating that she would not attend the conference until Great Britain recognized the conquest of Ethiopia. In spite of Italy's defiance, the conference would be a joint Anglo-French affair scheduled for 6 September in Nyon.

The Nyon Conference was filled with debate and discussion and concluded with a signed agreement on 15 September. The plan was made without German or Italian coordination because, as promised, they boycotted the meeting. The French and British chargé d'affaires went to Italy to deliver personally a copy of the agreement and to see if something could be worked out. By 21 September, Italy agreed to a new patrol plan and another agreement was signed on 1 October.

In September, 1937 the Internationals were placed under the control of the Spanish Republican Army and Paris became fixated on withdrawing the volunteers. Delbos asked Italy to attend a meeting to discuss the volunteer problem and

Italy refused unless Germany was also invited. Again Delbos threatened to open the frontier. At a meeting on 16 October, French Ambassador Corbin outlined France's proposal for withdrawal and threatened to resume "full liberty of action" if something was not agreed to quickly.⁵² While the Committee remained bogged down over details, Delbos kept to his word in opening the frontier when an agreement was not reached until 4 November. Blum summed the situation up, "We voluntarily and systematically shut our eyes to arms smuggling and even organized it."⁵³

January, 1938, was a cruel month for an offensive. Frostbite and blizzards forced the Spanish Republic to turn to the Internationals who were again thrown into battle on 18 January. In London, the Committee was now stuck on another diplomatic problem - what initial number of withdrawals would be satisfactory to the participants. The German representative to the Committee, Woermann, stated, "... unreal... all the participants see through the game of the other side but only seldom express this openly. The Nonintervention policy is so unstable, and is such an artificial creation, that everyone fears to cause its collapse by a clear 'no' and bear the responsibility."⁵⁴

The Committee continued to argue over a quantitative or qualitative withdrawal of volunteers and on 12 March,

1938, Hitler shook up the Committee by another act of aggression - the march into Austria. France continued to squabble with her old enemy on the Committee, Italy, when Italy refused to agree with the submitted British plan for withdrawal until France closed its borders. Blum was now back in power after the Chautemps government had been brought down by the Socialists and Blum gave in to Italy but "did not like the idea of having to give in to Mussolini's demands at the insistence of the British..."⁵⁵

By April it seemed that the end of the Spanish Republic was near as the Nationalists maneuvers cut the country in two. The Nationalists were now in Aragon and refugees were starting to flood into France. About 20,000 people passed through heavy snow drifts to reach France, although the government refused to keep anyone who had fought in the war. Civilians were given temporary asylum but were returned as soon as the government could turn them around.

By the summer of 1938, the Committee could say that it finally accomplished an agreement for withdrawal. A 21 June revision to the original British plan was agreed to by all when France closed the frontier after having opened it in May. Daladier, a Radical Socialist, was now in charge

of the French government and he too, succumbed to British pressure to close the frontier. Maybe Daladier had done some good for the Republic, however, because some 25,000 tons of material had crossed the opened border in May. In July, France, Great Britain, and Italy agreed to pay £125,000 each to get the withdrawal plan started. The British were elated at the success of their withdrawal plan but the French were vocally displeased with the whole process. Germany and Italy had not made a single concession to the Committee while officially and openly aiding Franco. France, on the other hand, had never "officially" aided anyone and her concessions had weakened her internally and internationally.

A New Political and Economic Struggle Begins

A farewell parade for the Brigades was held in Barcelona on 29 October. It was as emotional as the cause for which the men fought. Some 6,000 volunteers marched in front of thousands of Spaniards who cheered and cried as they passed. Since the French had established the Brigades, Andre Marty was asked to address the men that he had organized. He tried to assure them that the war was not over, "Nous partons! Mais nous n'allons pas nous reposer. Nous changeons de front et d'armes; mais nous

continuerons la lutte pour l'Espagne, la lutte contre le fascisme."56

As the Internationals departed, the Republic found itself gasping for its last breath. In January, air raids around Barcelona were continuous and while France agreed to open the frontier again, it was too late. The Republican government fled to Gerona on 24 January and Prime Minister Negrín then arrived in France on 7 February. On 9 February, Franco and his troops reached the French border and on 12 February, he offered the conditions for surrender. The burden that France was now asked to carry was a heavy economic one. The border was crammed with refugees pushing to get into France. France refused initially but the situation got out of control and several camps were then established for the 500,000 refugees. The camps were simply open sand with barbed wire around them. There was no food, water, or sanitation and men resorted to digging holes in the sand for shelter. The government finally allocated 30 million francs in February for initial aid but this was only the beginning. No country would take more than a handful of the refugees, and few offers of assistance were forthcoming. France would pay a considerable price for keeping the refugees, but not nearly

as great a price as she would later pay for refusing to stop fascism in Spain.

France has been repeatedly criticized, and Léon Blum in particular, for refusing to help Republican Spain by not standing up to the dictators. France was made to look even worse in light of the aid that Stalin was providing to Spain for he was determined not to bend to Italy and Germany. Yet it is easy to sympathize with Léon Blum when he said, "My soul is torn." The overwhelming feeling that he was doing the right thing for peace in Europe was prevalent in his words and policies. In Blum's defense, no one could really see the fate of Europe during that passionate summer of 1936 in Spain. The French people, caught up in the ideologies of the day, gave their lives for Spain's cause, more than any of the 53 nationalities fighting in the war. Then there were men like Malraux, Cot, and Thorez who fought and pleaded for Spain and came to represent bravery in the face of the cowardice of nonintervention. The cowardice of France is determined by only judging the outcome of the war superficially and concluding as Tint does, "that in the last analysis, no one cared about principles."⁵⁷ To understand Blum's position and the bravery of those who fought for and in Spain, one must understand the ideologies and the fear of general war

that led these men to act. Perhaps, then, one can understand why Blum referred to Spain as "my torture" when he desperately battled to keep peace at any price.⁵⁸

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CHAPTER IV

"Neither good wind nor good marriage
comes from Spain."

Portuguese Proverb

Portugal's leader, Antonio Oliveira de Salazar, saw the potential disruption that the events in Spain could bring to his reformation of Portugal. Long heralded Portugal's fiscal savior, Salazar also claimed to be her ideological savior through his corporatist 'religion.' Salazar and corporatism were to build a new Portugal that would stand as a capitalist bastion against the increasing threat of communism, a new Portugal governed by a responsible bourgeoisie that ruled in the name of religion and family. Such a goal required a unitarian state in which all classes accepted these same political and social standards. To allow any deviation from these standards, such as is practiced with parliamentary democracy, would only hamstring governmental efficiency. Only a strong, authoritarian system could save Portugal and so Salazar chartered her on his corporatist course.

Salazar was having some visible progress with corporatism (a balanced budget, improved lines of communication) but felt that Portugal's greatest weakness

was how to form an elite to support his ideals. This internal problem had not been resolved when the external problems of 1936 exploded in Portugal. Fearful of a spill over from Spain, Salazar launched a strong anti-communist crusade that quickly transformed his regime from authoritarian to totalitarian. "The revolutionary storm which at present is shaking the world and threatening the very foundations of society imposes on us the very first duty of taking the power to uphold the state and to defend uncompromisingly the lines of order. To save the nation from ruin and anarchy it is necessary to be master of the state."¹ As master of the state, Salazar assumed greater cabinet powers, installed loyalty oaths, tightened censorship, and formed militias. He saw Portugal as under siege from communism and was determined to prevent any form of encroachment: "We are anti-parliamentarians, anti-democrats, anti-liberals... we are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism... we are against class warfare, irreligion, and disloyalty to one's country... we are antagonistic to all the great heresies of today."² This antagonism would be manifested in Portugal's tactical and strategic stance concerning Spain and would be displayed in spite of diplomatic and international repercussions. Initially, the impact of Portugal's tactical assistance was highly effective and

consisted of forming the paramilitary Legiao and the Mocidade for youth, while defiantly providing covert assistance to Spain's rebellious generals.

Salazar Upsets the Military Balance

There are many allegations that Portugal was the center of the Spanish conspiracy long before it occurred, as early as 1934 according to one author.³ This is hardly surprising since the leader of the revolt, Sanjurjo had been living in Portugal and was killed when he flew to join the uprising. To assist him, Franco's brother, Nicolas, was operating in Lisbon under the name Aurelio Fernando Aguilar and was acting as procurements supervisor for the rebels. The rebels' headquarters was openly established at the Hotel Aviz in Lisbon. Their mission was twofold: obtain war materials and reunite the Nationalist offensive that had been cut in two (a northern and southern nationalist command had been formed in Burgos and Seville with the Republic blockading them in the center).

Salazar took personal charge in intervening; "The President of the Cortes, Salazar, has personally eased the acquiring by the revolutionaries of every type of war material."⁴ It was no secret that the German carrier "Kamerun" had landed in Lisbon after it was turned away by the Republicans at Cádiz. The first German installment of

war materials unloaded light tanks, aircraft parts, and hand grenades, 23 carloads in all, according to observer Jay Allen of the Chicago Tribune.⁵ This was only the beginning, though, as Portuguese arms factories supplied Franco immediately with machine guns, hand grenades, and the most precious commodity of all fuel. "All her ports, railroads, and highways were used to move vast amounts of German and Italian war materials. "...Salazar removed all difficulties within a very short time by his personal initiative and personal handling of details."⁶

Secure in the acquisition of war materials, the rebels needed a means of communication to link their divided northern and southern commands. A direct telephone line was established from the Hotel Aviz in Lisbon to Seville and Burgos, thereby uniting General Mola in Burgos to General Franco in Seville. The Republican ambassador to Portugal, Albornoz, was not so fortunate with his communications and found himself confined to his quarters, his lines to Madrid in less than satisfactory working condition. The press and radio were also directed to assist the rebels. Portuguese radio stations were made available to the insurgents and one in particular, the Radio Clube Portugues was theirs alone to broadcast all the propaganda they wished. In addition to the national support of radio and press, Salazar also provided economic assistance. O Banco Nacional of

Portugal formed a business relationship with Franco's bank, El Banco de Espiritu Santo, and several large loans were arranged.

With so much German, Italian, and Portuguese aid, the military balance was quickly upset. The Portuguese border area fell within a month, most notably represented by the battle at Badajoz. Using Portuguese airfields, Franco was able to fly his German Junkers and bombard the capital without interruption to his logistics. The rebels had previously established a base about two kilometers from the Portuguese village of Caia and were able to refuel unopposed during the attack. Under the direction of Lt. Col. Yagüe, Badajoz fell on 14 August, 1936. Soon thereafter, Cáceres, about 50 kilometers north, also fell and the Republic was dealt its first major loss as the rebels now controlled the entire Portuguese border. Salazar's police turned back the hundreds of refugees that sought protection and a well-published photograph of the slaughter in the Badajoz bullring told of what happened to the remaining Republicans. Visiting the border, a Portuguese frontier police told Jay Allen what occurred to fleeing civilians, "Of course we're handing them back. They are dangerous for us. We can't have Reds in Portugal at such a moment. It's being done up and down the frontier on orders of Lisbon."⁷

Internal Mobilization

Quickly helping the rebels obtain a decisive victory, Salazar turned to his own armed forces and decided that an anti-communist paramilitary unit needed to be established. The Legiao was established in September, 1936, and consisted of some 20,000 men. It proclaimed both a military and political role, a standing armed force that "stood for the defense of the social order, repudiating anarchy and anti-clericalism and maintaining faith, family, nation, christianity, and moral authority."⁸ The Legiao consisted of brigades and commands that were separate but integrated with the regular military structure. It was headed by a Junta Central with five members that were appointed by the government, two of whom had to be active military officers. Legiao leaders were usually important political and military persons whose positions often led to more influential posts. Legiao members wore green shirts and gave the fascist salute, but Salazar denied any foreign connection. They were "the living expression of the moral conscience of the nation," Salazar explained.⁹ The Legiao had as its youth movement the Mocidade, for boys ages 7-14. This was followed by the Vanguardistas (ages 14-17) and then the Cadetes (ages 17-21). The Mocidade provided civic and moral education, physical training, and Christian education. These youth and para-military movements, along with the

Armed Forces, established the unit that assisted Franco, the Viriatos. Little is known of the soldiers that fought for Franco and even the approximate number ranges anywhere from 6,000-20,000. Each of these groups, whether providing internal or external security, represented a form of social order for Salazar, order that he hoped would keep the country at peace. "Order always goes hand in hand with peace. When a country, even by reason of an exaggerated national spirit, arrives at a state of perfect order, it is obviously more disinclined to go to war than a country which is constantly agitated by internal strife."¹⁰

Domestically, Salazar formed the Legiao because he felt the Portuguese lacked cohesion and civic discipline and needed the state of emergency mentality that the Spanish Civil War produced in order to foment their nationalism. He justified his external actions of overt assistance against a legitimate Spanish government by claiming a fear of invasion that would ultimately lead to Portugal's loss of independence to communism. However, not all nations saw the situation as Salazar did and some began to voice concern about his blatant support of the rebel generals. In particular, France and Portugal's oldest ally, Great Britain, were concerned and alarmed by the cohesion that Portugal, Germany, and Italy were displaying in their support of the Nationalists. The concerted British and

French effort to get all the powers to withdraw their interest in Spain and to sign a nonintervention treaty verifying their intentions not to interfere in Spain was made more difficult by Portugal's obstinance. Among the 27 signatory countries only one country refused outright to adhere to its provisions - Portugal.

Strategic Implications

Portugal's diplomatic coup was but one aspect of its strategic role in the Spanish Civil War. There was also its shared border with Spain, a border that Portugal felt was being threatened by Spain's internal problems. Portugal had a long history of being suspicious of Spain's motives and the current war was not reassuring. Portugal made consistent reference to a quote by Spanish Socialist Largo Caballero, who proclaimed Portugal would be incorporated into a Federation of Iberian Soviet Republics. This was the political intent that Salazar needed to justify his zealous reactions. To prevent such an event from occurring, Salazar sought a Nationalist belt which would protect Portugal from the potential usurpation by the besieged Spanish government. Thus, the Nationalists may have isolated Portugal from communism but at a cost of seeing overland communications with continental Europe now broken. Portugal was virtually an island that could only be reached by sea. This barrier,

however, seemed a small sacrifice when threatened with Iberian communism:

"We have interests of a special nature in the Peninsula, and we are exposed to risks from which other powers are immune...some do not believe in the Communistic danger; we, on the contrary, see it and feel it...Where the people and governments are at the mercy of several Internationals there can be neither natural liberty nor independence. This determined our attitude from the beginning and our opposition to nonintervention as being detrimental to Spanish nationalism, which is the barrier between Portugal and Iberian communism (my emphasis). From this springs the odium to which we are subject, and which in all conscience, I must admit to be entirely justifiable."¹¹

Another dimension of strategic importance was Portugal's diplomatic alignment with Germany and Italy. Salazar perceived that if Spanish nationalism were capable of protecting Portugal from Iberian communism, then the supporters of Spanish nationalism, i.e., Germany and Italy, should be held in high esteem. Salazar said of Hitler, "Europe owes him a great service in having forced back with dauntless energy the menacing tide of Communism. Only I fear he may go too far in the economic and social spheres."¹² Yet, German and Italian influence were prevalent in Portugal, and Salazar was visibly impressed with the Germany's sense of order and Italy's relationship with the Church. Militarily, Portugal turned to Germany

because of Great Britain's refusal to help Portugal modernize her armaments industry and rearm. As Germany's military influence increased, so did her cultural and social influence. German presence was influential with the upper classes, the universities, the para-military, the press, and the radio. The Portuguese made no secret of their admiration for Germany's technical knowledge, nor did they hide their admiration for the orderliness of the Third Reich. Salazar's loathing of communism turned him toward whatever power could impede its influence and the strongest power at that point was Germany. Salazar explained his philosophy, "Although Nazism is disliked, it is still a bastion against Communism."¹³

Armed with a hatred of communism, a fear of invasion by Republican Spain, and admiration for Germany and Italy, Portugal attempted to lure Great Britain into the arena against Republican Spain. Herein lies the third and most important strategic concept of Portugal's role in the war: her threatened relationship with her oldest ally, Great Britain. Historically, Britain had rendered aid or assistance to Portugal seven times since their first treaty was signed in 1385.¹⁴ This alliance was viewed as a valuable safeguard for Portugal's independence and her colonial possessions. There were also strong economic ties between the two countries in trade and in finance. Yet, the

alliance was not a one-way street wherein powerful Great Britain militarily and financially aided tiny Portugal. Great Britain also needed Portugal to have access to the Atlantic approaches to the Mediterranean. This was a crucial point in how Great Britain diplomatically approached Portugal. Great Britain feared that Italy was gaining a foothold in Spain by aiding Franco and felt that the only way to curb a Fascist takeover of the Mediterranean was to reiterate her alliance with Portugal. Yet Portugal was obviously siding with the Nationalists while Great Britain urged all of Europe to assume a noninterventionist policy. The resolution of these diverse stances would place a tremendous strain on this weathered alliance, a strain that would ultimately allow the rest of Europe to label Great Britain a paper tiger.

For Portugal, Great Britain made several strategic errors at the outset of the war. First, Salazar could not understand Britain's reluctance to support the Spanish Nationalists and their efforts to impede the communist advance. By not seeking a rapprochement with Franco, Salazar knew that the Axis powers would seize the opportunity to gain access to the peninsula. Secondly, Salazar was also dismayed at France's repressed support of the Republic. It seemed obvious that a leftist government in Spain would be dependent on Russia and Russia would then

seek to control France. If Great Britain had supported Franco as she should, then France would not have to fear either Axis or communist domination because Great Britain would temper the situation. Thirdly, Great Britain failed to take an immediate stance at the outbreak of the uprising and this mystified her ally. The ideological implications seemed quite clear to Salazar and he wasted no time in reacting to Europe's ideological break-up: "Thus it was that Germany and Italy, with their recognized support of Franco, achieved at one period a fortuitous and possibly passing popularity in Portugal at the expense of Great Britain."¹⁵

Great Britain would have to pay a heavy diplomatic price to overcome these "errors" — Portugal's refusal to join the Allies' camp. It was almost two weeks into the war when France and Great Britain decided upon the concept of nonintervention and its applicability to all parties directly or indirectly participating in the war. For the first committee meeting, all invitees responded affirmatively until only three hold-outs were left by the end of 25 August — Germany, Italy, and Portugal. Portugal stipulated that it wanted France and Britain to guarantee that they would aid Portugal if its territory were threatened. Additionally, Portugal wanted the Committee to declare Tangiers an independent port with neither side having access to it.¹⁶ Portugal's ambassador to Spain

voiced his prediction to Delbos, "In the event of the defeat of the insurgents, I consider a Soviet regime will be inevitable; there will in consequence be an attempt to foment revolution in Portugal and a war against Portugal is to be expected."¹⁷ Portugal's diplomatic ploy made the French suspicious and the British anxious. The many rumors about munitions transport through Portugal and the overt activities of the Nationalists in Lisbon served to place Portugal in a crucial diplomatic position. Salazar must have realized this and took great liberty in rejecting so many of the nonintervention proposals that he retained virtual freedom of action. The French and British governments felt that they had taken a bold diplomatic risk in attempting to orchestrate this difficult agreement and Portugal's hedging left them exasperated. Without question, Portugal's absence from the Committee could cause its collapse: "The gravest disquiet existed about the passage of Fascist arms through that country."¹⁸

While the French accused Portugal of buying time (note the defeat of Badajoz on 14 August and the subsequent Nationalist victories along the Portuguese border in August), Great Britain bore the blame for not bringing her ally in line with the rest of Europe. The French were angry that this small nation could wield such disruptive power but Salazar would not be dictated to, "...the silence of the two

Great Powers could not alter the force of [our] reserves and conditions and it could not induce us to cease to consider them essential."¹⁹ Salazar's relentless determination was based on what he perceived as fluctuations in British policy: firstly, that Britain refused to help modernize Portugal's arms industry and, secondly, Britain's inability to take sides and see the gravity of the Iberian situation. Britain's persistent neutrality was defended on 29 August, 1936 by a member of parliament, Sir Samuel Hoare, when he explained that the fighting between rival factions in Spain "is not our direct concern...much as we regret it, we must be cautious and deny the Spanish government the help to which she is legally and morally entitled."²⁰ Such caution was as baffling to Salazar as it is to many who view the war in retrospect. Denying arms to a legally established government was an unusual policy to adhere to and can only be explained by the prevailing alarm and fear of the potential of general war. Salazar, however, was wary of what he saw as a fluctuating and mystifying policy and decided that he would evaluate what came out of the London meetings before he compromised Portugal's independent policy.

Obstructing Events in London

The Powers would not allow Portugal to impede further

nonintervention efforts, and when Germany and Italy confirmed their support of the Committee, the first meeting was held on 7 September, 1936.²¹ Portugal, meanwhile, experienced the mutiny of two warships that had prepared to sail to Spain (denounced as a "fake" by a Paris newspaper "Lumière"²²). Salazar proposed that this was proof that Spain's war was now an international war and he refused to allow the London committee, "to tie Portugal's hands while leaving to others complete freedom of action."²³ Without Portugal, the Committee attempted to create a common policy in a sensitive atmosphere of denials and allegations. It was a tense, combative situation and entirely predictable, according to Salazar. Based on his own unhappy experience with democratic politics, the actions of the Committee were further proof of Britain's misguided policy and the hopelessness of democratic procedure. Just why Salazar then decided to participate in the Committee is left to speculation.

Perhaps it was the Nationalist's rapid victories or perhaps international pressure that Portugal was the impediment to peace that brought Portugal to London for its 28 September meeting. Whatever the real motive, Portugal's official position was stated by Dr. Armindo Monteiro, Minister for Foreign Affairs: "Not wishing to take the responsibility of preventing or delaying the conclusion of

an agreement which may have beneficial results, it declares its adherence in principle (my emphasis) to the idea which has given rise to this proposal."24 Portugal, however, was not about to sit back and acquiesce to British and French hands-off policy and was often accused of hampering and delaying the Committee's proceedings. One observer commented, "If peace is maintained in Spain, it is no thanks to Portugal. This nation has joined Germany and Italy as one of the bad boys of Europe."25

Dissention was prevalent in the meetings now that Portugal was present to defend its policies. Bitter debate ensued on 9 October between Russia and Portugal when Russia demanded that observers be sent to monitor Portugal's borders. Portugal walked out of the meeting, convinced that its worst fears of internal intervention had come to pass. The Committee was at a stalemate and the encounter was labeled "remarkable for the undiplomatic vigor of the language that was used."26 The Russians remained in relentless pursuit and continued to pressure the Portuguese representative at the 12 and 23 October meetings. The Committee's chairman, Lord Plymouth, was annoyed with the Russian allegations and saw them as inhibiting cooperation between Russia and the Fascist powers. He responded, "The Committee on this occasion [feels] no action should be taken on the statement made by the Russian representative."27

Britain's Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, appeared naively zealous in his defense of Portugal: "I need hardly say that the government never for a single second entertained such a proposal, nor have we any information whatever to support the Soviet charges, nor, finally has the Committee, as I understand it, been able to support any single one of the Soviet charges against the Portuguese government."²⁸

Britain's continued defense of Portugal would be difficult when Portugal's next action was undiplomatically defiant - early recognition of Franco's forces as the legitimate government of Spain.

Portugal justified her recognition of Franco's forces in October 1936, by denying the legitimacy of the Madrid government. Because the Republican government was not representing the unified will of the people (the February 1936 elections disprove this) the government was not legitimate and therefore the conflict could not be ended by electoral means. As a conflict between two civilizations, a decisive victory was the only answer. Portugal's groundbreaking recognition was followed by German and Italian recognition of Franco in November. Time and again, this pattern would be repeated with Portugal, Italy, and Germany pursuing one policy while Russia hurled accusations and France and Great Britain attempted to mediate. Such actions ensured that the Committee remained in a constant

state of flux, minimizing violations in pursuit of a diplomatic victory.

Throughout the upcoming months, as the Committee attempted to resolve the major issues of neutrality; withdrawal of foreign volunteers, sea observations, and border observation/patrol schemes. Portugal was defiant and obstructive. As early as December, 1936, Portugal declared that the nonintervention agreement was "now proved to have failed."²⁹ With some consideration, Salazar did hope to keep from alienating Britain entirely by agreeing to allow British observers into Portugal during the summer of 1937. Salazar agreed to this because of "confidence in her attitude of impartiality and of the alliance between the two countries."³⁰ Portugal still retained the upper hand, however, with the caveat that the British observers "would not possess the powers originally suggested for the international controllers."³¹ Two months later Portugal then hurled another diplomatic insult at Britain by subsequently suspending the observers' access to Portugal. This was done in support of Germany and Italy who had withdrawn from the naval patrol scheme over alleged violations. It consequently took months to renegotiate both the land and naval patrols.

Economically, it was questionable how Portugal could be allowed to disrupt these patrols with so little fiscal

weight behind it. All 27 participating governments had contributed specific amounts of the estimated £898,000 per annum patrol costs. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the USSR each assumed 16% and all other governments combined contributed the remaining 20%. It is an amazing testament to the strategic and political importance of Portugal that its voting influence was so great while, in essence, the country contributed so little.

By 1938, two years after its inception, the Committee was finally able to accomplish an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign volunteers. The volunteers paraded through the streets of Barcelona, a defiant representation of the neutrality that was supposed to end the war. Legally bound to withdraw, the volunteers were helpless to prevent the strangulation of the legitimate Republican government. Left without any international power to purchase arms, the Republic was crushed within four months of the withdrawal and Franco marched victoriously into Madrid in April 1939.

Defying the Allies for Franco

Franco's victory had already been acknowledged by Salazar when Salazar initiated the Pacto del Bloque Iberico on 17 March 1939. Salazar wanted to bring Spain closer and create a mutual security against outside intervention. Salazar felt that Britain should appreciate the fact that

Spain emerged from the war with only one foreign commitment - her treaty with Portugal. He bore no grudge against Britain for not being more sympathetic to Portugal's plight but did convey a certain smugness in corresponding to the Portuguese ambassador to the U.S. in April, 1939:

"Portugal has the right to recall the errors made by others, because despite our correct behavior and loyalty to England, the Portuguese attitude was not understood by third powers and was opposed by them, and we therefore had an unpleasant and dangerous time of it. The position of England and France right to the end was of no help at all, on the contrary, it was a great hinderance to the policy pursued by us on behalf of all Western powers."³²

Salazar, and many other European leaders and the press, openly criticized Britain and France's neutral policies and voiced their dismay at the futility of the Committee. The Committee was a farce and became a recurring theme for political barbs and newspaper cartoons in which Britain was seen as a paper tiger, unable to control even a weak ally like Portugal. Yet because she was a sea power, Britain's need for the Mediterranean weakened her negotiations with the obstinant Salazar, who openly flaunted his defiance of Britain's aims and objectives. In spite of the many indications that Salazar aided the rebels, Britain preferred to protect Portugal rather than give credence to a

non-ally like Russian. Thus, even as chairman, Britain could not impartially oversee the actions of the Committee because she was blinded by her desire for peace and resolved to maintain her access to the Mediterranean through Portugal.

For his part, it can be said that Salazar predicted the world situation better than the Allies. He foresaw that Britain's "peace at any price" policy would not smother the Communist vs. Fascist spark and early on decided that Portugal would play an active rather than passive role in the policies of the Great Powers: "In Portugal there are no illusions as to the consequences of such a victory; they would represent the fulfillment of long-standing revolutionary ambitions. Caught between the claws of the Communist pincers, how long could Europe resist?"³³

Portugal did her share in assisting the Axis to prepare for its greatest offensive by playing a crucial role, both tactically and strategically, in the Spanish Civil War. It can be judged that the war would have taken a different course had Lisbon remained neutral and Salazar supported her ally's nonintervention policy. But this small nation did neither, and for at least a short while during the twentieth century, Portugal was crucial in determining events in Spain and the political balance in Europe.

Chapter IV Endnotes

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CHAPTER V

"So they came in long columns from all countries, all who knew poverty well enough to die fighting it, and some had guns and those who had no guns used their hands, and one after another they came to lie down on the earth of Spain"

André Malraux

The Spanish Civil War evoked many such emotional responses from those individuals who answered the Republic's call for aid. But the collective international reply to her call took on a more diplomatic approach. The political aspect of intervening powers represented a strategic and a tactical viewpoint that foretold of potential political struggles around the committee table as well as the battlefield. Yet for France and Portugal there loomed yet another aspect that was equally as threatening as the battles won or lost in London and Spain — the internal reaction that would rapidly alter their existing domestic policies and eventually their leader's pattern of government.

As a democracy, France was probably more susceptible to political upheaval because Léon Blum could not resort to authoritarian methods of silencing dissention. Blum found himself contending not only with a deeply divided, emotional

public but also had to mediate among legislators and cabinet alike. Blum felt a moral obligation to support the Republic and had the additional legal obligation of a treaty. These, obligations, however, could not dissuade him in his role as executive to override the caution expressed by his divided cabinet nor could he ignore the outrage leveled at him by the Assembly, the press, and the public. Blum expected opposition from the Right but he was distressed at the division among his own supporters. The Radicals' attitude was most perplexing to Blum and even more so since they held two key posts in his Cabinet, that of Foreign Minister and Minister of War. The Senate did not refrain from reminding Blum that he had a duty to neutrality and its President, Jeanneney, was critical of Blum's decision to invite a war over Spain. The press joined the melee against Blum beginning on 23 July when L'Echo inquired of the government why it purposed to "commit this crime against the nation."¹

In spite of the division in the Cabinet and the Assembly, members were united in their desire for peace. During the 1936 election that brought the Popular Front into power, the Right had ridden on a ticket of anti-Marxism and neo-pacifism. The Left had also proclaimed the desire for peace and was prepared to safeguard it. Yet both sides were apprehensive and wary of each other's political motives. The Right's trepidation of social upheaval was matched by the Left's fear of fascism. How to preserve peace had

created another conflict and Blum saw no alternative but to accept Delbos' suggestion of nonintervention.

Unfortunately, Blum's decision only served to deepen the internal political chasm as neither side could abandon its political fear of a "fascist" or "bolshevist" victory. Since the Left could not decide whether peace would best be achieved by supporting the Republic or supporting the government's policy of nonintervention, they allowed the issue to split them to a point of no return. This division coincided with deepening economic troubles of the country, and compelling Blum to resign after being denied decree powers. Thus, the war had brought a split to the Left that signaled the end of the Popular Front's effectiveness in office. Above all, Blum's nonintervention stance had lost him the support of the working class that openly promoted aid for Spain. Blum sensed the degree of distrust that nonintervention brought to his government: "It was not the financial difficulties which conquered us; it was not even the adverse votes of the Senate - nothing would have overturned us if we had no had the feeling that the working class was no longer responding to our advice."²

If internal dissention and the demise of the Popular Front government were the Spanish Civil War's effects on France's internal politics then the opposite effect occurred in Portugal. Whereas democracy allowed the dissention that ultimately rendered Blum's government ineffective, author-

itarianism allowed Salazar to strengthen his government. Salazar could employ the censorship that had been openly contested by Blum's opponents. Salazar was not subject to internal checks and balances that might dissuade or prevent him from implementing his policies. His reaction to the war was to ensure that he unquestioningly held the reins of power and he did so by assuming more cabinet power, increasing censorship and forming state militias that were sworn to defend his crusade against communism. Salazar waited until September, 1936 — approximately two months after the rebellion began — to form the paramilitary Legiao.

Although he had done his share to ensure a Franco victory, Salazar correctly ascertained that the war was not going to be a short uprising. His resolve to prevent any of Spain's agitation from filtering into Portugal was manifested in the 20,000 member Legiao. Thereby, Salazar led Portugal in the exact opposite direction that Blum guided France. Through mobilization, Salazar hoped to maintain an ordered society that would preserve peace. Such a mobilization seemed anti-pacifistic and unnecessary to French politicians who would not abide such an overt show of force. Salazar openly rejected the pacifist notion and internally changed Portugal, both militarily and politically, to confront the perceived communist threat looming on the Spanish border.

Salazar did not limit his military reaction to forming

the Legiao for Portugal's protection. Again he was not bound by democratic dissention as Blum was and he was not hesitant to aid the rebellious generals. Thus, Portugal came to be a significant contributor in its tactical support of the Civil War. Portugal's location was of inestimable value in two aspects: it allowed for geographically close planning of the coup before it took place and it allowed continuous close support once the coup began. This was a critical factor in early Nationalist victories when Spain was split in two. By using Lisbon, Franco and Mola were allowed to create a pincer effect and effectively seal off the Republic's forces. Salazar had personally intervened to ensure that all obstacles were removed in resupplying the rebels; he supplied men and equipment to fight in Spain itself, and he allowed Portugal to be used as a coordination area for securing the entire area around her border. Salazar's overt tactical support would come under criticism as the nonintervention policy was gradually accepted throughout Europe's diplomatic community but it was of little consequence. Salazar had effectively given everything his small country could give to ensure a short-term victory. Any prolonged conflict would have to rely on the military powerhouses of Europe — Germany and Italy.

Leon Blum was not given the latitude that Salazar had in supporting his political conscience. Blum's initial tactical support to the Republic consisted of supplying a

few aircraft and arms before the nonintervention proposal effectively ended any overt government support. It took a few months for the reality of Blum's policy to sink in and by October a people's call to arms had been coordinated. The tactical contribution of the French Communist Party and individuals such as André Malraux was probably more of a heroic victory. What they created was a unique concept in history whereby an organized international force was formed to defend a military uprising in another country.

In spite of France's governmental policy of non-intervention, Marty, Thorez, Malraux, et. al., actively pursued the formation of ground and air forces to aid the struggling Republic. They were rebels in their own right that defied their country (and at times the Republic) in the defense of their beliefs. Without initial support from any of the major powers, they effectively coordinated a fighting force that would become a legacy of the war and perhaps of this century, the International Brigades. Men and women from 53 nations answered their call and won the respect and admiration of many who stood back and envied their resolve.

In spite of their participation in some of the worst battles and the credit they earned by turning back the Nationalist forces at critical moments, they could not overcome the tactical superiority of the well organized, Axis-supported forces of Franco. While they may have tactically lost, they still gained international attention

and respect for the Republic's cause. It was for this reason that their heroic contribution could not be overshadowed by tactical wins or losses. It had appeared that what the French government had lacked in a national policy of defending her ally, her people had restored. Thus it can be said that France's people became the tactical support of her contribution to the war and in spite of overwhelming odds, helped buoy the Republic for almost three years. Could the Republic have survived without their support? Perhaps. But Malraux's planes and Marty's forces made an invaluable contribution to the Republic's cause and came to represent a show of the people's force in light of the French government's apparent weakness in confronting the dictators.

It was this fear of facing the dictators that prompted France to conduct some unusual strategic policies regarding Spain. France was in the unenviable position of being a democracy with a leftist coalition in power. That meant there was no clear cut position for her to take in the ideological division of allies. A pact had been signed with the leftist governments of the U.S.S.R. and Spain but the Right clamored for stronger ties with London. Their mistrust of the revolutionary policies of the U.S.S.R. left the Right vulnerable to accept any form of government capable of stopping bolshevism. London seemed to be the only solution for a French alliance after the militarism of

Hitler and Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia cast the dictators in a threatening light. France had historically feared Germany and the current rearmament/expansionist tendencies were terrifying. Hitler had advised in 1933, "We should be happy if the rest of the world, through the reduction of armaments, relieved us of the necessity of always increasing ours."³

Blum had immediately flown to London after receiving the Republic's request for arms and was told "officially" to be careful of intervening in Spain. Unofficially, Blum was told that Britain would not support French intervention and would not consider herself obliged to aid France in the event of armed confrontation. Blum was then left with several unappealing choices. One, he could ignore London, supply arms, and risk bringing down his own government over war in Spain. Two, he could seek closer ties with Russia, confront the dictators openly in Spain, and hope that Soviet/French support would save the Republic and thus his own government. Three, he could adhere to London's warnings, ask that no arms be provided by either side, and preserve his government by advocating a neutrality in Spain that would eventually lead to a Republican victory.

As a man who desperately wanted to avoid another world war in Europe, Blum felt compelled to avoid confrontation in Spain and on blind trust, devised the policy of non-intervention. Blum could not risk closer ties to the Soviet

Union unless he had Britain's support. A balance had to be achieved so that his own government would not be brought down by the Right and the dissentors among the Left. It appeared that Blum could not rely on what should have been solid support to his government—his own colleagues of the Left and his staunch ally, London.

In retrospect, Blum's position showed the Allies' weakness in facing Hitler and Mussolini and highlighted the need for solid collective security. Abandoning Spain was done on the grounds of preserving peace but it was Blum's continuation of such a futile policy that was so disturbing to members of the Left. Was Blum's caution justified? Could a confrontation in Spain have prevented the future World War? It doesn't appear that Blum could risk war in Spain without the united efforts of Great Britain and the Soviet Union just as Germany, Italy, and Portugal had united for the Nationalists. France was not as strong militarily as Germany and feared the possibility of "going it alone" in Spain. Additionally, Blum could not ignore the divisions within his own government on the slim chance that victory might be achieved in Spain. George Windell criticizes Blum's judgment: "He seriously overestimated the danger of war and of a right-wing rebellion, but these were errors of judgment that might be expected from a socialist with a profound commitment to peace and a doctrinaire suspicion of the motives of the right dating from his youth."⁴

When a nation decides to intervene in a neighboring civil war it should be based on: (1) a perceived threat (economic, ideological, etc) (2) the threat of or actual act of armed invasion (3) obtaining the military strength to repel that threat and (4) the support of allies for a contingency of additional arms, finances, etc. Blum was solely dealing with a perceived threat in Spain's Civil War. To involve his country in a neighboring Civil War against militarily superior forces without the support of a stable ally like Great Britain was asking for an ideological miracle instead of a rational foreign policy. France was neither militarily nor mentally prepared to enter a war that may have required additional support from her allies. At the same time, Britain was so determined to keep peace that even after agreeing to France's policy of nonintervention, she pursued an independent policy with Italy, "Mr. Chamberlain's concessions to the Italian Ambassador in London, and the revelations of the level to which British diplomacy had sunk in Rome, must be read to be believed."⁵ It is not surprising that the Axis powers were able to read through the disunity of the Allies and perceived the weakness of these "degenerate" democracies against their "virile" nationalism.⁶

An independent policy may have been possible for France but at what cost? Blum decided it would be better to align with London and remain as head of government than to risk an

independent policy in Spain, thus alienating London and risking his downfall. Blum, rightly or wrongly, felt that the democracies must unite against fascism and with Britain's lead for neutrality, he resigned France to weak diplomatic policies whose principle aim was the preservation of peace. At the time, he was probably compelled to a policy of peace, unable to assess the extent of the dictators' resolve. Blum would absolve himself years later when he explained his dilemma in his autobiography, "Dans l'affaire espagnole, c'est de Londres que les initiatives sont venues depuis plus d'un an, et ce sont les positions de Londres qui ont, en fin de compte, determine ou entraîne les positions de Paris."⁷ For those who judge Blum's reactions as cowardly and that his fear of war was overestimated and an error in judgment, then perhaps the Italian ambassador to London, Ciano, best explained what Blum was facing when Ciano told a British diplomat, "Thirty battalions, fully equipped are ready to embark at the first sign of French intervention. We shall do this even if it should provoke a European war. Thus I ask you to urge the French to be moderate and to realize the sense of responsibility the situation demands."⁸

Without an overt threat of invasion, Blum could not justify intervention in the war. The consequences for France were constant internal strife and growing diplomatic weakness. Conversely, Portugal was able to justify her

intervention based on what Salazar perceived as the threat of a communist invasion. Salazar felt that his small country was no match for the Russian-supported government of the Republic and he, like Blum, immediately turned to his oldest ally, Great Britain, for help. Britain's neutrality stance was baffling to Salazar and he instead turned to the forces that supported his fear of an invasion - Germany and Italy.

Salazar's obsession to protect Portugal from communism prompted him to reject his democratic allies because they neither saw nor felt the threat. By then siding with Germany and Italy, Portugal was able to reverse her normally weak diplomatic role and exhibited the determination to stand against Great Britain's neutrality. Britain was then criticized because Portugal overtly rejected the non-intervention agreement and made Britain look helpless to persuade even a weak country like Portugal.

Portugal's defiance of her weathered ally seems to hinge on one basic premise - Britain's failure to reassure Portugal that her sovereignty would be protected. Salazar had previously requested that Britain help modernize Portugal's military but Britain had stalled, possibly hoping to prevent Portugal from joining Europe's growing tide of militarism. By the time that Portugal felt threatened by events in Spain, Salazar had transferred his alignment to Germany and looked to Hitler for the support that Britain

denied.

Since Britain was no longer in a position to assist Portugal, what bargaining power did she have to lure Portugal to the nonintervention committee table? In reality, none. Without the reassurance of any present or future military support, Britain was as dependent on the good faith of Portugal as France's faith on Germany and Italy. Salazar actually had nothing to gain by supporting Great Britain's policy and with much to lose, he assigned Portugal to the military might of Germany and Italy.

Portugal's strategic stance was indeed ironic. Whereas France remained allied with Britain and became diplomatically weak, Portugal rejected Britain and became diplomatically strong. Obviously her rejection of Britain was based on the strength of the dictator's support but Portugal nonetheless effectively removed herself from British influence, and then reduced Britain to seeking Portugal's support of British policies. Portugal's position only served to substantiate the united strength that Germany and Italy represented against the "democratically weak" governments of Britain and France. By riding their coattails, Portugal was able to strategically affect the politics of Spain as well as the political balance of Europe.

All the policies of France and Portugal, internal, tactical, and strategic, demonstrated the profound affect

that the Spanish Civil War had on their governments. Europe became an unsettling ideological battleground where the internal political divisions took precedence over national security and even steadfast allies waived in the lure of growing nationalism. The changes that occurred in the politics of Portugal and France were not lasting ones—Portugal eventually returned to her second-rate diplomatic status and France reassumed her position of a first-rate military and diplomatic power on the continent. Yet, it was her neighbor's war that prompted a vast array of diplomatic and political changes that threatened to bring down both governments. And it was, in reality, how they chose to support the war in Spain that ultimately determined their government's international strength.

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